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THE ONGOING EVOLUTION OF STATE
REVENUE SYSTEMS
WILLIAM F. Fox*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Economists often evaluate revenue systems using a series of criteria,

including fairness, revenues, economic effects, administrative costs, and
political and legal constraints. Each characteristic is important in the
development of a good tax system, but designing revenue systems that
provide sufficient funding over the long-term without the need for frequent
rate increases is the most significant challenge facing state governments
during the next decade. Thus, significant weight should be placed on the
revenue goal during tax reform discussions. States may differ in their
decision on the appropriate size of government, with some preferring
relatively large and others relatively small governments. Regardless of this
decision, the revenue system must be designed to generate sufficient revenues
to finance the appropriate level of government so that rate changes are not
necessary to maintain the chosen size. Establishing what are sufficient
revenues is not a decision that can be measured during a single year but
instead must be evaluated in a dynamic context, meaning the revenues must
be sufficient not only in the current year but also in the years to come.
The concept of sufficient revenue must be viewed in a dynamic
framework because most service delivery is an ongoing process that is broken
into years for accounting and political convenience and not because there is a
corresponding beginning and ending to the services. The problems associated
with not having a revenue system to properly finance government in coming
years is much more likely to create fiscal stress or inadequate service delivery
than any problems resulting from shortfalls (or excessive revenues) in the
current year. In other words, fiscal stress is much more likely to be the result
of an accumulation of problems over a number of years than the outcome of a
single year of difficulties. The frequent focus on current-year funding reflects
political shortsightedness. Given the difficulty of enacting policy changes, the
ability of the fiscal structure to finance government over time is a greater
* William B. Stokely Distinguished Professor of Business and Director in the Center for
Business and Economic Research, University of Tennessee. This Article was prepared for the
Wisconsin Tax Policy Colloquium, Marquette University Law School, April 15-16, 2004.
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concern than the ability in the current year. Thus, sufficient revenue is best
thought of as existing when revenue growth matches the growth in
expenditures that is required to maintain the level of services that a state
chooses to deliver.'
The size of government, likely best measured as a percentage of the
economy, will differ among states based on the taste for public services and
other factors. The growth in revenues, however, should be determined not by
decisions on how large government should be, but by the annual increases in
the costs of delivering those services that government has chosen to provide.
The growth in revenues should only vary (in a long-term sense) if an explicit
decision is made to increase or decrease the size of government. Thus, the
long-term expenditure growth relative to the economy should be similar
across states, with differences occurring only to the extent that the growth in
expenditures varies because of the state-specific mix of services provided or
the rate of state economic growth, or because a decision is made to increase or
decrease the size of government.
No simple answer exists to the question of how fast government spending
should be expected to rise. A reasonable expectation is that revenues should
rise at approximately the same rate as the economy (perhaps measured by
personal income), which means that state government would stay a constant
share of the economy unless an explicit decision is made to decrease or
increase the size of government. Through the Taxpayer Bill of Rights
("TABOR"), Colorado has chosen to limit spending from revenue growth to
no faster than the combination of inflation plus population change, which
when compounded over a number of years will significantly reduce state
government as a share of the economy. 2 There are several reasons why the
Colorado growth rate may be unduly limiting. First, choosing an appropriate
inflation rate for state government is difficult. A consumer-based inflation
measure, such as the consumer price index, or a broad economic measure,
such as the gross domestic product deflator, likely fails to measure the
inflation confronting state governments. States are particularly affected by
1. Stability of tax revenue sources can also be an appropriate goal, but a properly sized rainyday fund can be developed to equate the flow of revenues and expenditures over the business cycle.
Thus, the growth in both expenditures and revenues is best evaluated over the long-term, say a
business cycle, rather than the annual growth, which is determined by a series of short-term, often
cyclical factors. Still, stability may be necessary to the extent that it is not politically feasible to build
the required rainy-day funds.
2. See COLO. CONST. art. 10, § 20. Colorado's structure imposes several other limitations that
will cause expenditure growth to be too slow. First, the constraint placed by population and inflation
is always compared to the previous year, so long-term revenue growth will fall below this sum if the
growth in any year fails to reach the constraint. Second, annual revenues are limited to a 6% growth
rate.
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recent health care cost inflation because their expenditures are very heavily
weighted towards health care (Medicaid, employee fringe benefits, and other
health department costs).
Second, an increase in expenditures at the rate of inflation plus population
growth will result in a long-term decrease in a state's ability to deliver
services. Consider the case in which K-12 education, states' largest
expenditure item, rises at the sum of these two factors. Expenditure growth at
this level allows states to maintain a constant pupil-teacher ratio and to
increase expenditures at the same rate as inflation. In other words, education
spending would be constant in real, per pupil terms, assuming that pupils
grow at the same rate as the population. Teachers would be able to receive a
raise equal to the rate of inflation if the pupil-teacher ratio is held constant,
and schools would be able to continue buying the same items each year.
However, teachers would receive raises that are lower than the average in the
private sector because the private-sector raises are approximately equal to
inflation plus productivity gains. Over time, the quality of people choosing
careers in education and the people who stay in education will be diminished
by the decline in their relative wages, which suggests that the quality of
education should ultimately fall.3 Thus, education expenditures must rise
faster than inflation plus population change if the quality of education services
is to be held constant. Similar arguments can be made for many other public
services as well.
Economic forces are lessening states' control over their tax systems,
magnifying the problem of creating sufficient revenue systems. Much of this
Article is a description of the forces that are changing the ways in which states
tax and that are compelling state revenue systems to continue evolving with
the changing economic structure, shifting behavior of people and businesses,
and rising mobility. The remainder of the Article is divided into three parts.
Part II addresses states' fiscal performance in recent years followed by a
section on the Wisconsin state tax structure. Part III examines the reasons
why state tax revenues have been, and likely will continue, to rise less rapidly
than the benchmark identified here. Finally, the Article concludes with an
analysis of four options that states should consider to maintain their revenue.
II. STATE FISCAL PERFORMANCE

Selecting the appropriate revenue instruments, structuring them correctly,
and putting the necessary weight on each source are key steps to designing a
3. Note that the argument refers only to changes in relative teacher salaries as they exist today,
without reference to whether current teacher salaries are (or should be) higher or lower than those
paid to individuals with the same education and skill levels.
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properly performing revenue structure.
State revenue elasticity is the
revenue-weighted average of individual tax elasticities, so it is necessary to
evaluate the revenue performance of the individual taxes to understand how
the system will grow. States can select certain slow-growing tax instruments
as long as the necessary set of fast-growing instruments is chosen as well.
Tax revenues in the average state have grown more slowly than the
economy during the past decade, even without excluding the effects of tax
rate changes from the data.4 Table 1 sets forth selected tax elasticities
calculated for Wisconsin and the United States from 1992-2002.
TABLE 1: SELECTED TAX ELASTICITIES, WISCONSIN AND THE UNITED STATES,

1992 TO 2002
Tax
Total
General Sales
Selective Sales
Individual Income
Corporate

Wisconsin
0.91
1.08
0.85
0.89
0.35

U.S.
0.92
0.96
0.75
1.09
0.38

Between 1992 and 2002, 5 tax revenues rose only 91% as fast as the
economy, owing mostly to slow growth in corporate income and selective
sales taxes. Economists term the rate of growth of tax revenues divided by
the rate of growth of state personal income a "revenue elasticity."6 An
elasticity greater than one means tax revenues grow faster than the economy,
an elasticity of one means that revenues grow at the same rate as the
economy, and an elasticity below one means that tax revenues grow more
slowly than the economy. The elasticity lower than one resulted in revenues
falling from 6.36% of personal income in 1992 to 6.09% in 2002. Thus, state

4. A mixture of rate increases and decreases occurred during the 1990s. The sales tax had the
strongest pattern of rate increases, with 19 states raising and 5 decreasing their rate. The corporate
income tax was more even, with 9 states increasing and 9 decreasing their rate, though the rate
increases were on average larger than the rate decreases. There was a slight downward trend in the
individual income tax rate, with nine states increasing their rate (partly because Connecticut added
the tax) and 12 decreasing their rate.
5. These years are approximately similar points in the business cycle, both falling shortly after
the end of the recession. Nonetheless, the slower rebound in revenues during the latter business
cycle may lead to a downward bias in the elasticity calculations.
6. The growth in revenues not adjusted for rate changes is often termed buoyancy rather than
elasticity.
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governments would have raised nearly $1.5 billion (out of $533.4 billion in
actual 2002 collections) more in 2002 if the same share of personal income
were collected as in 1992.'
Revenue elasticity calculations normally measure only the relationship
between revenues at the endpoints, but revenue patterns during the
intervening years are also important to overall state revenue conditions.
Revenue growth was very strong during many of the interim years, meaning
that state fiscal conditions were better than the elasticities suggest. From
1992 to 2000, states in total generated $131 billion in collections above the
amount they would have raised if tax revenues remained at the same share of
personal income as in 1992. 8 Properly structured rainy-day funds would have
retained these revenues for dealing with the shortfalls of 2001 through 2003
and would have significantly softened the state revenue "crisis" of 2001 to
2003.
The specific taxes performed very differently over this time period. The
individual income tax grew somewhat faster than the economy, even after the
significant declines in tax revenues during 2001 and 2002. 9 The sales tax, on
the other hand, grew a little slower than the national economy during this
same time period. The corporate income tax and selective sales taxes
(primarily taxes on motor fuels, tobacco products, and alcohol) have increased
very slowly.
State funding challenges are exacerbated by the high degree of revenue
volatility. For example, states experienced widely different revenue growth
during the past 15 years. Figure 1 shows that the 1990s began with a
recession and the accompanying slow revenue growth. This was followed,
after a lag, by strong growth during most of the 1990s, particularly during the
late 1990s. Beginning in 2001, states experienced their slowest revenue
growth period during at least the past three decades and suffered the first year
of actual revenue decline (2002) in their modem history. In fact, total state
tax revenue was lower in 2003 than in 2000.

7. The percent of income paid in taxes varies from year to year, so defining a baseline is
difficult, but 1992 represents a relatively low baseline year.
8. William F. Fox, Three Characteristicsof Tax Structures Have Contributed to the Current
State Fiscal Crises, ST. TAX NOTES 375, 376 (Aug. 2003).
9. Tax revenues grew much more slowly than the economy when 2003 is used as the endpoint,
owing to the very weak revenue performance during the past three years.
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The revenue pattern of 2001 to 2003 does not by itself mean that the longInstead, the volatility that it
term tax performance has been altered.
demonstrates emphasizes the importance of examining tax structures based on
long-term performance and using rainy-day funds to counterbalance the
annual fluctuations. Still, the very different annual performance of state tax
revenue during the past decade makes it difficult to discern the underlying
pattern of state revenue growth and whether the underlying pattern has been
altered.
III. WISCONSIN'S TAx STRUCTURE
Figure 210 establishes that Wisconsin's combined state and local
government tax liabilities as a share of personal income are 5th highest among
U.S. states and the District of Columbia and 9th highest in per capita terms. 1

10. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS AND BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS.
11. State and local governments are combined for cross-state comparisons to account for
differences in the relative responsibilities assigned to state versus local governments.
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FIGuRE 2: 2000 STATE AND LOCAL TAX COLLECTIONS AS A PERCENT OF
PERSONAL INCOME
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State government alone ranks a little lower at 12th and 1 lth, respectively.
Wisconsin's revenue elasticity was similar to the rest of the country's from
1992 to 2002.12 Wisconsin, like many other states, could have established a
sizeable rainy-day fund if the revenues in excess of those necessary to
maintain revenues as a constant share of personal income had been deposited
in the rainy-day fund. Thus, Wisconsin generated $4.3 billion more in total
tax revenue between 1992 and 2000 than was necessary to maintain spending
at the 1992 level. Approximately $2.6 billion of this surplus would have been
spent in 2001 through 2003 if the same level of spending relative to the
economy had been maintained through these 3 years. It is important to see
these calculations as indicative of a pattern that Wisconsin could have taken,
and not as a precise recommendation because the specific calculations are
dependent on the year used as the base.
Individual Wisconsin taxes performed differently from the national norms
across the past decade. The sales tax elasticity has been much higher and the
individual income tax elasticity much lower than the national norm. This
pattern is consistent with econometric-based estimates of Wisconsin tax
elasticities. The long-run Wisconsin sales tax elasticity is higher and the
income tax elasticity is lower than the average state. 13 Several characteristics
of Wisconsin's tax system work to lower the income tax elasticity, including a
12. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
13. Donald Bruce, William F. Fox & M. H. Tuttle, Tax Base Elasticities: A Multi-State
Analysis of Long Run and Short Run Dynamics (2003), at http://web.utk.edu/-dbruce/bruce.fox.
tuttle.0803.pdf [hereinafter Multi-State Analysis].
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high-income threshold for the highest marginal tax bracket, a modest degree
of progressivity (a comparison of the relative relationship between the lowest14
and highest marginal rate), and the existence of a low income tax credit.
There is also evidence that the annual Wisconsin elasticities are highly
volatile, being near zero for both taxes in bad times and very large in good
times. 15 Among other implications, the volatility of elasticities suggests that
tax revenues should begin growing relatively rapidly during the next 12 to 24
months, at the latest.
Wisconsin's state tax structure is focused relatively more on personal
income taxes and relatively less on all other tax categories than is the average
state's structure (see Figure 3). The heavy concentration is achieved without
unusually high income tax rates, since Wisconsin's maximum 6.75% rate is
17th highest among the states with progressive taxation. 16 The relatively low
income tax elasticity causes Wisconsin's overall tax elasticity to be low even
though the income tax provides a high percentage of tax revenues.
FIGURE
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14. Id. at 19-20.
15. Id. at 31.
16. See Fed'n of Tax Admin., State IndividualIncome Taxes, at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/
rate/ind inc.html [hereinafter State Individual Income Taxes]. Rhode Island, which imposes its tax
as a percent of the federal income tax liability, states with a flat tax, and states without a state income
tax are excluded from this ranking.

STATE REVENUE SYSTEMS

2004]

IV. STATE REVENUE OUTLOOK

A.

Causes of State FiscalDifficulties

Analysis of past tax growth is much like analysis of past stock portfolio
performance-it is not necessarily an indicator of future performance. Still,
analysis of past patterns, combined with an understanding of the underlying
determinants of these revenue trends, can signal the likely future direction of
revenues. In assessing the probable revenue pattern, the focus here is on how
the tax base responds to economic growth so that it is possible to assess
revenue patterns from the existing legislated tax structure. No significant
attempt is made to assess how states may legislatively respond in terms of tax
rates, but the ongoing pattern of legislated base changes is discussed.
The individual income tax is the main hope for a tax that will rise rapidly
relative to the economy and potentially offset the slower growth of other
revenue sources. The individual income tax's revenue growth in the average
state has been very robust. It is estimated that for every state with both
personal income and sales taxes, the personal income tax grows much faster
relative to the economy than the sales tax (the income tax elasticity is larger
than the sales tax elasticity) and the income tax grows faster than the economy
(the elasticity is greater than one).' 7 The rapid income-tax growth path is
probably one important reason why income tax rates have been decreased in
recent years. Unfortunately, income-tax growth is prone to be erratic, as has
been seen during the past several years, but over the long-term it performs
well.
States are their own greatest risk in terms of future income tax revenue
growth. Long-term income tax performance is likely to remain relatively
strong but will weaken in coming years relative to the past 30 years as states
feel pressure to lower rates and narrow the base. 18 Pressures will exist to
lower income tax rates, as has already been occurring, and to flatten the
individual income tax schedule. A key reason is that rising population
mobility makes it increasingly difficult to tax higher income people heavily
because of the greater avoidance/evasion possibilities that they enjoy. 19 The
problem is compounded by lower federal marginal rates combined with the
phase out of deductibility, which raise the cost of state taxes and increase the

17. See Multi-State Analysis, supra note 13, at 11-12.

18. For a summary of existing state income tax characteristics, see WIS. LEGIS. FISCAL
BUREAU, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX PROVISIONS IN THE STATES, INFORMATIONAL PAPER 4 (2003),

at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lfb/informationalpapers/4.pdf.
19. States will also feel strong political and economic pressure to lessen inheritance taxes on
high-income individuals.
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incentives for high-income people to engage in tax planning. High-income
people are apparently already using similar avoidance techniques to those
described below for corporations in order to lower their tax burdens. Today,
35 states and the District of Columbia use progressive tax rates, though in
states like Kentucky, the rates are proportional over much of the income
range. 20 Wisconsin imposes progressive rates, with only 5 states levying their
highest marginal rate at a greater threshold than Wisconsin.21
Base narrowing, such as for nonlabor and pension income, will also
receive considerable attention. The focus will be on the more mobile forms of
income, and particularly those sources that are not tied to the local labor
market. Thus, the personal income tax will increasingly look more like a
wage tax.
The other major state tax sources are expected to remain
inelastic-grow relatively slowly--during coming years. Weak growth in
selective sales taxes is easily understood from the tax structure choice. The
bases for these taxes, which are primarily levied on tobacco, alcohol, and
motor fuel products, are frequently determined by the quantity of
consumption, such as packs of cigarettes, gallons of gasoline, and gallons of
alcohol. Thus, revenue growth is slow because quantity rather than value
serves as the tax base and because consumption of these items has grown
relatively slowly in recent years. The next Section provides a detailed
examination of the sources of slow growth in sales and corporate income
taxes.
B. Underlying Causes of Slow Sales and CorporateIncome Tax Growth
An important and less understood issue is why sales and corporate income
taxes are performing weaker than -might have been expected. The obvious
answer is that the revenues have grown poorly because the tax bases are
growing more slowly than the economy. The corporate income and sales tax
bases have been narrowing as a share of the economy for many years, and the
net effect is slow revenue growth.
Figure 4 illustrates the long-term
movement of the sales tax base relative to personal income, using personal
income as a broad indicator of overall economic activity.
Figure 5 demonstrates the movement of the state corporate income tax
base relative to total corporate profits, as measured for national income
accounting purposes.

20. See State IndividualIncome Taxes, supra note 16. This total includes Rhode Island, which
accepts the federal progressivity by setting the state tax liability as a percentage of the federal tax
liability.
21. See id.
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Total corporate income is a broad gauge of the base that states are seeking
to tax. The effective corporate tax rate (revenues divided by profits) fell by
about 35% since 1991, though the effective rate may have risen again in
2003.22 Figures 4 and 5 both evidence the general pattern of a base that is
falling relative to the economy. The 5 underlying causes of slow growth in
these two taxes are similar, including state-legislated base-narrowing,

22. Based on the quarterly revenue data that are available from the Bureau of the Census.
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difficulties in taxing multistate activity, federal policy changes, consumer
behavior changes, and greater tax sheltering. This Section addresses each of
these causes.
1. Legislated Base-Narrowing
Both the sales and the corporate income taxes have been subject to
significant base-narrowing through policy decisions made in state capitols.
Recent examples of legislated sales tax base-narrowing include decisions to
exempt food, prescription and nonprescription drugs, and business machinery,
and to grant sales tax holidays. Twenty-nine states (including the District of
Columbia) now exempt food and 4 others impose a lower tax rate on food
than the general sales tax rate.23 With the exception of Illinois, all sales taxing
states have traditionally exempted prescription drugs, and there are now 12
states (including the District of Columbia) that exempt at least some
nonprescription drugs and one imposes a lower rate on nonprescription
drugs.24 Minimal base expansions have to some extent offset the policy-based
exemptions, but the overall effect has been for legislation to significantly
reduce the base.25
Sales tax holidays are a particularly recent form of base erosion. New
York offered the first sales tax holiday in 1997, and 12 states (including the
District of Columbia) granted sales tax holidays in 2004.26 Eleven of the 12
states provided a tax holiday on clothing (often with the holiday applying to a
maximum value per item), 6 on computers, and 7 on school supplies.2 7 The
holidays often are for 2 to 3 days, but a few states had 7-day holidays in
2004.28 Tax holidays are one of the most obvious examples where good tax
policy and political benefits point in opposite directions. Tax holidays are a
very poor idea when compared against a standard of good tax policy, 29 but it
23. Fed'n of Tax Admin., STATE SALES TAX RATES (2004),
http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/sales.html [hereinafter STATE SALES TAX RATES].
24. Id.
25. Most base-broadening discussions have focused on expanding the taxation of services. Both
Florida and Massachusetts enacted significant expansions of the base to services during the past 20
years. However, the Florida legislation was in effect for about 6 months. William F. Fox &
Matthew Murray, Economic Aspects of Taxing Services, 41 NAT'L TAX J. 19, 21 (1988); see also
Fed'n of Tax Admin., SALES TAXATION OF SERVICES, UPDATE 1 (1997), at http://www.taxadmin.
org/fta/pub/services/services.html (providing a listing of the existing extent of service taxation in
states). The Massachusetts legislation was never implemented. Texas also enacted some substantial
expansion to services.
26. See Fed'n of Tax Admin., State Tax Holidays: Tax Holidays Return to Favor (updated July
2004), at http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/rate/sales-holiday.html.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Richard R. Hawkins & John L. Mikesell, Six Reasons to Hate Your Sales Tax Holiday, ST.
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has proven politically difficult to argue against a holiday from paying taxes
unless a fiscal crisis exists.
Wisconsin's sales tax base is only about 43% of personal income, where
the sales tax base divided by personal income measures sales tax base
breadth. 30 The breadth of Wisconsin's sales tax base is below the median
state (tied for 27th among the sales taxing states).3 ' Still, the issue in base
erosion is not the breadth per se, but how the breadth has been changing in
response to legislated policy and other factors. Wisconsin does not appear to
have selectively narrowed the sales tax base as much in recent years as many
states because it has not granted sales tax holidays, newly exempted food, or
provided an exemption for nonprescription drugs. Nonetheless, as described
below, other factors are also causing base erosion.
Legislation in many states has narrowed the corporate tax base both as the
outcome of planned state strategies and because of unintended consequences
of statutes that were passed for other reasons. Increasing the weight on the
sales factor has been one means where state tax decisions were expected to
narrow the base, though in principle, changing the weights could modify the
base in any direction. Wisconsin is one of 24 states that double-weight the
sales factor in the corporate income tax apportionment formula.32 Eight states
place more than 50% weight on the sales factor.
The creation of limited liability companies ("LLCs") and limited liability
partnerships ("LLPs") during the 1990s, 33 which was generally expected to
provide limited liability for owners of small businesses, has become an
unintended means of narrowing the base in many states. 34 LLCs have reduced
state tax revenues in part because states did not modernize their tax legislation
to accommodate the new form of business entity, apparently because states
presumed that individuals subject to the personal income tax would own
LLCs, so that the income would be passed through and taxed at the individual
level. In fact, the formation of single-member LLCs by large corporations has
become an effective means of tax planning, an issue discussed further below.
Income earned by an LLC owned by a single out-of-state member may be
TAX NOTEs 801 (Mar. 2001).
30. See Donald Bruce & William F. Fox, E-Commerce in the Context of Declining State Sales
Tax Bases, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 1373, 1378 (2000).
31. Id.
32. See Fed'n of Tax Admin., STATE APPORTIONMENT OF CORPORATE INCOME (2004), at
http://www.taxadrnin.org/fta/rate/corpapp.html (summarizing corporate apportionment formulas).
Note that state apportionment formulas sometimes vary by industry.
33. Two states, Florida and Wyoming, had LLC legislation in place prior to 1990.
34. See William F. Fox & LeAnn Luna, Declining State Corporate Tax Revenues: Effects of
Aggressive Tax Planning and State Policy Decisions (June 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file

with the author).
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taxable under a state's corporate income tax, but there are legitimate questions
regarding whether a company with no presence other than owning another
company that has nexus can be subjected to a state's corporate income tax.35
Also, states often apply tax structures differently to LLCs. For example,
Kentucky does not impose the corporate franchise tax on LLCs (some other
states do this as well) and allows LLCs to apportion income using a single
factor sales formula.
The justifications for legislated narrowing of both tax bases have also
been similar. In some cases the base-narrowing represents good tax policy
and in others it does not. Indeed, in some cases, legislation is necessary to
conform the tax structure to the intended tax base. For example, sales tax
exemptions for manufacturing equipment have been provided (or subjected to
lower tax rates) by many states during the past 15 years, and this represents
movement to a more conceptually appealing tax structure. Still, the effect of
the exemptions is to erode the tax base and slow revenue growth.
In many cases several explanations can be given for why transactions or
income are granted exemption or special treatment. Enhancing economic
development has been the primary argument for many exemptions, with states
responding to pressures by businesses and local communities that certain tax
structure changes would be important economic stimulants. Both sales and
corporate income tax exemptions have often tended to focus on more mobile
economic businesses and transactions. Thus, concessions, such as altering the
weight on the sales factor in the corporate income tax formula, are only
beneficial to multistate firms, based on the assumption that this type of
investment is the most mobile. These schemes can lower the effective tax rate
on the more mobile, often larger firms and still keep the tax in place on other
firms. Imposing taxes on the least mobile activity is generally consistent with
the optimal tax rules developed by economists, based on the notion that the
excess burdens from taxation arise from distortions in behavior. 36 Multistate
firms, though, are at best a very rough proxy for the most mobile capital.
In some cases the exemptions are granted to broad classes of firms based
on the expectation of stronger economic growth. Sales tax holidays, sales tax
exemptions for manufacturing capital, and greater weight on the sales factor
in the corporate income tax all have been justified as means to stimulate state
economies and are generally available to wide groups of firms. Narrower

35. See Elisa Fay & Sharlene Amitay, Attention LLC Members: Is Nexus a Foregone
Conclusion? ST. TAX NOTES 821 (Sept. 2001).
36. Alan J. Auerbach & James R. Hines, Taxation and Economic Efficiency, in 3 HANDBOOK
OF PUB. ECON. (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002).
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exemptions by firm3 7 or area have also been granted because of perceived
economic development gains. Firm-specific exemptions are frequently
provided based on the argument that they are necessary to attract or retain a
particular business. Concessions for specific geographic regions, such as
enterprise zones, are often based on the hope that taxes can strengthen the
local economy or raise incomes of people living in the area by attracting
firms. Again, regardless of the type of exemption or concession, the net effect
is to narrow the tax base. Even if these structural changes stimulate economic
activity, the effects will be much less than the lost revenue so the tax base
shrinks. 38 Said differently, tax exemptions are not self-financing.
Improving fairness and simplicity have also been important arguments for
base-narrowing. Sales tax exemptions for food and drugs and sales tax
holidays have been justified on the basis of fairness. An obvious problem is
that the consumption of nearly every commodity is regressive against current
income, so these exemptions will not create a progressive sales tax. Further,
the benefits are very poorly targeted to low-income people, making these
exemptions very expensive means of assisting low-income individuals.
2.

Federal Policy

Federal policy has also been an important factor in base-narrowing for
both the sales and corporate income taxes. Nearly every state determines
corporate taxable income by beginning with the federal definition of taxable
income, making some adjustments, and apportioning the income into the state.
As a result, federal policy decisions and administrative practices are very
important to state corporate tax revenues. Federal action or inaction has also
been key to the sales tax performance. These issues are addressed in this
Section.
a. FederalLimitation of its Own Tax Bases
Bonus depreciation that was enacted through the Job Creation and Worker
Assistance Act ("JCWAA") in March 2002 and modified through the Jobs
and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act ("JCTRRA") in May 2003 is a
good example of recent federal decisions that are expected to reduce state
(and federal) corporate taxation. Many states have responded by decoupling
37. The specific firm may not be mentioned by name, but the statute is written such that only
one firm can qualify for the special tax treatment.
38. See generally Michael Wasylenko, Taxation and Economic Development: The State of the
Economic Literature,NEW ENG. ECON. REv. 37, 42-43 (1997) (providing a summary of the effects
of taxes on business locations); William F. Fox & David T. Mayes, Are Economic Development
Incentives Too Large? Proceedings of the Eighty-Seventh Annual Conference, NAT'L TAX ASS'N
203, 205-06 (1994) (discussing why tax concessions are likely to be excessive).
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from the bonus depreciation legislation, but decoupling from other federal
legislation has been less frequent. As of December 2003, 17 states were
allowing the bonus depreciation to at least some extent for state tax purposes
and 22 states, including Wisconsin, had decoupled.39 Other states were not
affected by the legislation for reasons such as they had adopted federal
legislation as of a particular point in time and were not subject to federal base
revisions.
Recent corporate scandals and poor federal corporate tax performance
have attracted considerable attention to the accuracy of corporate tax reporting
and whether corporate tax bases were properly reflecting business conditions.
Corporate book income and federal corporate taxable income have been
diverging in recent years, as illustrated by Jonathan Talisman during his
tenure as Acting Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy of the Department of
Treasury. 40 He found that book income was approximately equal to taxable
income in 1991 but had grown to be 40% greater by 1996.41 Interestingly,
this deviation far exceeds any change in the federal taxable base relative to
National Income and Product Accounts ("NIPA") profits, suggesting that
NIPA profits are also diverging from book income. The federal effective tax
rate was about the same at the beginning of the 1990s and in 2000.42 The
failure to find large reductions in the effective federal rate suggests that the
problem may be more an increasing overstatement of book income than an
increasing understatement of taxable income. But revenues should have
grown about 10% from the combined effect of the increase in federal revenues
as the average state effective tax rate was falling (state tax revenues are
deductible in calculation of federal taxes) and the nominal federal rate
increase in 1993 (and there were some other base expansions such as longer
lives for real property). This suggests that the federal base actually has fallen
about 10% relative to profits.4 3 Some reasons for the federal tax base decline
39. State Tax Rev. (CCH), December 30, 2003, at 4-8.
40. See Corporate Tax Shelters, Hearing before the House Comm. on Ways and Means 103d
Cong. (1999) (Statement of Jonathan Talisman, Acting Ass't Sec'y of Treasury for Tax Pol'y), at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/ls233.htm.
41. Id. at 4.
42. Based on data for the mid-1990s, some had suggested a significant decline in the effective
federal tax rate. However, the effective rate rose again at the end of the 1990s.
43. James Mackie III of the Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of Treasury, correctly
argues that changes in the effective tax rate can result from many factors, so this finding is at best a
general indication of the pattern. See James B. Mackie III, The Puzzling Comeback of the Corporate
Income Tax, 92 NAT'L TAX ASS'N PROC. 93 (2000). He decomposes the reasons why the average
effective federal tax rate deviates from the nominal tax rate into effects from treatment of
depreciation, S-corporations, losses, inflation, foreign source income, alternative minimum tax, and
others. He finds that the relative importance of these factors changes over time. Id. at 99-101. Still,
depreciation and S-corporations are the primary factors explaining why the effective rate is lower
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may include the check-the-box regulations, worldwide tax planning, and
expatriation of U.S. corporations. Additional tax sheltering is another
possible explanation for this decline. 4 A 10% decline in the federal base is
consistent with the shrinking federal base accounting for about 30% of the fall
off in the state effective rate.4' Thus, other factors must account for most of
the falling effective state corporate tax rate.
Professor Mihir A. Desai sought to decompose the key factors in the
growing spread of book income and federal taxable income, which is one
cause of slow growth in corporate tax revenues. 6 He focused on three main
factors: accelerated depreciation,47 repatriation of foreign income, and
nonqualified stock options. 48 While being important determinants of the
wedge between book and taxable income, these factors explained about only
one-half of the difference. He attributed the additional gap to tax sheltering.
He found that the three had differing effects over time, with accelerated
depreciation being much more important in the 1980s and nonqualified stock
options more important in the 1990s. 49 Excess depreciation accounted for

about two-thirds of the deviation during the 1980s, but for no more than onefifth during the 1990s. Jerome R. Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein note that
the large increases in depreciation under the Accelerated Cost Recovery
System ("ACRS") had a dramatic effect on state tax revenues in the early
1980s (and also the federal effective tax rate until 1984), causing many states
to decouple their tax base from the federal base.50 However, most states
conformed back to the federal base following the base-broadening effects of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
The exercise of nonqualified stock options currently accounts for the
largest share of the divergence (about one-half), after playing no role until
than the nominal rate, and his results evidence that there has been little change over the 1990s in the
role of these two factors. Id. at 100. However, the treatment of losses raises the effective tax rate
and inflation lowers it, and the role of each fell dramatically during the 1990s but in a somewhat
offsetting manner. Id.
44. For a description of some newer methods of tax sheltering, see JAMES R. HINES, JR.,
TIMELINESS OF TAX REFORM (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w8909, 2002), at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8909.

45. The 10% base shrinkage divided by the 35% decline in the state effective tax rate.
46. MIHIR A. DESAI, THE CORPORATE PROFIT BASE, TAX SHELTERING ACTIVITY, AND THE
CHANGING NATURE OF EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 8866, 2002), availableat http://www.nber.org/papers/w8866.
47. Professor Desai's results are unaffected by the recent bonus depreciation legislation as his
study period ended in 1998.
48. See DESAI, supra note 46, at 8-9.
49. Id. at 10.
50. JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS (1997).
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1992.51 The exercise of stock options reduces corporate taxable income but
not book income. Some states may not experience a revenue loss because the
excess of the market over the strike price is taxable under the individual
income tax. But a revenue loss can be expected in the 24 states where the
maximum corporate rate is higher than the maximum individual rate and in
the 9 states with no individual income tax.52 Reinvested earnings abroad are
responsible for one-third or more of the simulated divergence. This can result
either because foreign activity is growing rapidly or because of reduced
repatriation of earnings.
Further, Professor Desai simulates book income using the same factors.
He observes that simulated book income and actual book income, which were
relatively close until 1993, have begun to diverge. Actual book income has
been consistently greater than simulated book income, with the former being
26% greater than the latter by 1998. 53 He undertakes regressions of book
income on taxable income and finds results that are consistent with increased
tax sheltering at low levels of income. 54 He observes that lower probabilities
that tax sheltering will be detected and lower perceived penalties if it is
detected are explanations consistent with this pattern. Greater tax sheltering
will probably also lower state tax revenues.
b. FederalLimitation of States' Actions
Professors Charles McClure and Walter Hellerstein observe that the
federal government can intervene in state taxation in three ways: prohibiting
or limiting state use of existing authority, allowing states to tax in an area that
was previously barred, or a combination of these two. 55 The federal
government has directly limited the breadth of states' sales and corporate
income tax bases in several areas. States have been prevented from imposing
the sales tax on food-stamp purchases and on access to the Internet. The
food-stamp limitation likely represents Congress's intent to target relief to
low-income individuals and to expand the purchasing power of food stamps.
But, authority to determine progressivity (or extent of regressivity) of state
taxes has normally remained with the states, and as noted above, most have
51. See DESAI, supra note 46, at Table 1.
52. No revenue loss exists if the stock options are viewed as legitimate compensation because
they should be regarded as a deductible expense. However, failure to reflect the cost in book income
creates an incentive to provide excess compensation that is further encouraged by the tax savings.
53. Actual book income is 63% greater in 1998 than actual taxable income using Professor
Desai's data.
54. See DESAI, supra note 46, at 24.

55. Charles E. McLure, Jr. & Walter Hellerstein, CongressionalIntervention in State Taxation:
A Normative Analysis of Three Proposals,ST. TAx NOTES 721, 723 (Mar. 2004).
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chosen to provide preferred treatment to food purchases.
Congress first passed the Internet Tax Freedom Act ("ITFA") in 199856
and extended the legislation for an additional 2 years in 2001. The ITFA
prevented states from imposing discriminatory taxes on Internet-based
transactions and precluded states from taxing access to the Internet, except for
10 states that were allowed to tax access through a grandfather clause.57 Only
6 of these states continue to tax access.5 8 The House of Representatives has
passed a permanent extension of the ITFA 59 and the Senate recently passed an
extension of the legislation.6 ° Congress is likely to reach agreement on some
version of the extension, with the only question being the specific form that it
takes. Key issues that have slowed agreement on the final bill in Congress
include whether the legislation will be permanent and how broadly the
exemption for access will be construed. There are some major differences
between the House and Senate versions. For example, the House version
permanently extends the ITFA while the Senate version provides for only a
four-year extension of the ITFA. Effects of direct preemption of Internet
access on revenue have been relatively modest thus far, though some analysts
believe that the House version of the ITFA would have dramatic effects on
state telephone tax revenues. 6 1 Specifically, the breadth issue getting most
attention is whether Voice over the Internet Protocol ("VOIP") is access to the
Internet and therefore should be exempted from state sales taxes under the
62
new congressional legislation.
The omission of federal enabling policy has been more important for the
sales tax than the commission of federal preemption, though this could change
with the ITFA extension. Federal inactivity in enabling states to collect use
taxes on remote transactions has a much larger implication for state tax
collections (and local tax collections in 34 states) than explicit policy
decisions by the states. This issue is addressed in detail below.

56. Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1101-04 (1998).
57. There is no relationship between taxation of Intemet access and the propensity to go online.
Donald Bruce et al., Has Internet Access Taxation Affected Internet Use? A Panel Data Analysis,
PuB. FINANCE REV. 145 (Mar. 2004). They did find that sales taxation of computer purchases
tended to lower decisions to go online. Id. at 143.
58. For example, Tennessee recently stopped collecting the tax on access after court rulings
that Tennessee is unable to apply its existing telecommunications tax statutes to Internet access.
Prodigy Services Corp. v. Johnson, 125 S.W.3d 413 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
59. See H.R. 49, 108th Cong. (2004).
60. See S. 150, 108th Cong. (2004).
61. See, e.g., Michael Mazerov, A Permanent Ban on Internet Access Taxation Risks Serious
Erosion of State and Local Telephone Tax Revenue, ST. TAX REV. 669 (Feb. 2004) (discussing the
relationship between the Internet access issue and telephone taxation).
62. See id.at 67 1.
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Congress has also limited states' ability to collect corporate income taxes
through legislation such as Public Law 86-272,63 which prohibits a state from
levying a net income tax on a business whose only contact with the state is to
solicit for the sale of tangible personal property. This is not a new preemption
of state tax collection, but firms may have become much more adept in recent
years at arranging their corporate structure such that PL 86-272 can be used as
an effective tax avoidance mechanism. Congress is considering legislation
that would impose a physical presence nexus standard on the states with
clearly articulated bright-line tests for when physical presence exists. This
legislation would bring more certainty to state corporate income taxes but
would also more tightly constrain states' ability to levy the tax.
3. Remote and Multistate Activity
The rapidly increasing extent of multistate activity appears to have
dramatically lowered state sales and corporate income tax bases by making it
difficult for states to collect taxes on remote sales and by allowing firms
greater opportunities to shift income to low- or no-tax states. Currently,
precise numbers on the extent of remote sales are difficult to obtain, but some
evidence exists. The U.S. Bureau of the Census reported that e-commerce
transactions totaled $1159.5 billion in 2002. 64 In addition, mail-order houses
had sales of $82.3 billion in 2002, and this does not include the sales by firms
that make mail-order sales through a bricks and mortar firm. Mail-order
house sales grew very modestly between 1999 and 2002 but were lower in
2002 than in 2000.
sales,
dominate
e-commerce
transactions
Business-to-business
65
representing 92% of e-commerce according to Forrester Research, Inc. The
Census Bureau estimates that the retail portion of the activity, representing
only 3.8% of total e-commerce (some consumer purchases will be in other
categories such as wholesale purchases), rose by 58.7% between 2001 and
2003.66 Data on business-to-business transactions shows much slower growth
than on retail transactions between 1998 and 2002, but no data are available
for later years.
67
The United States Supreme Court ruled in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
that states could require collection of use taxes only by vendors with physical

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

15 U.S.C.A. §§ 381-384 (2004).
Author's calculations based on data at http://www.census.gov/eos/www/ebusiness614.htm.
See E-Commerce, supra note 30, at 1382.
Author's calculations based on data at http://www.census.gov/mrts/www/current.html.
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
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presence. 68 This holding limits states' ability to collect sales taxes on many
of the multistate transactions. Donald Bruce and William F. Fox estimate that
state and local governments lost an additional $15.5 billion in revenues in
2003 as a result of the advent and rapid growth in e-commerce and that the
losses are growing. 69 The losses in Wisconsin account for about 2.3% of the
national total. 70
Every sales taxing state has a corresponding use tax requiring payment of
the tax liability by the purchaser or user, a consideration brought into the
Bruce and Fox analysis. However, use tax compliance is very weak,
particularly by individuals. Approximately 19 states include a line on the
individual income tax to allow residents an opportunity to easily report their
use tax liabilities, but even these states collect little revenue through voluntary
compliance. 71 An informal survey conducted by the Federation of Tax
Administrators several years ago found no state collecting as much as $2
million through this avenue. 72 Business compliance with the use tax is better
but still appears to be very poor by comparison with other taxes. For
example, the state of Washington found 27.9% noncompliance for the use tax,
by comparison with 1.3% for the sales tax and 1.5% for the business and
occupations tax.73
The Quill case was decided in part on Commerce Clause grounds that the
compliance costs for multistate vendors exceed those for single state vendors
and distort interstate commerce. Over the past several years, the states have
undertaken the Streamlined Sales Tax Project ("SSTP") in cooperation with
the business community in an effort to find a mechanism through which
vendors can be required to collect the use tax on remote transactions. The
intent is to simplify sales and use tax compliance to the point that compliance
burdens for remote and local vendors are similar and any effects on interstate
commerce are eliminated. The National Governors Association reports that
20 states have passed legislation in compliance with the Streamlined Sales

68. Id. at 318.
69. Donald Bruce & William F. Fox, State and Local Sales Tax Revenue and Losses from ECommerce: Estimates as of July 2004, ST. TAX NOTES 511, 512 (Aug. 2004) [hereinafter Updated
Estimates].
70. See id. at 514.
71. NINA MANZI, USE TAx COLLECTION ON INCOME TAX RETURNS IN OTHER STATES,
POLICY BRIEF, MINN. H.R. (2003).
72. Informal Survey, Fed'n Tax Admin. (1999) (on file with author).
73. Don Gutmann, Department of Revenue Compliance Study: Executive Summary, Research
Report # 2003-1, WASH. DEP'T OF REVENUE 4 (2003), at http://dor.wa.gov/Docs/Reports/
Compliance study_2003.pdf.
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Tax Agreement that grew out of the SSTP, 7 though not all states may have
fully complied with the agreement. 75 Economists view the SSTP as an
attempt to enforce a destination-based sales tax. The conventional wisdom
has been that destination-based consumption taxes are less distorting than
origin-based structures (which exist if remote sales cannot be taxed).
State corporate income tax planning occurs in a variety of ways, including
by arranging transactions to take advantage of the preemption provided
through PL 86-272 and by taking advantage of differences between state tax
structures. Differences in nexus requirements, combined reporting statutes,
and breadth of the taxable income base are some of the areas that firms can
exploit to lessen their tax liabilities. The problem is complicated by the
creation of LLC statutes without updating of the corporate tax statutes. The
use of Delaware holding companies to transfer income out of states, which is
available in part because Delaware does not tax the income from intangibles,
is a frequently discussed mechanism to lessen tax burdens. Data are not
available on the extent of state tax planning and how it is growing, but there
seems to be consensus among analysts that it is expanding very rapidly.
4. Changes in Consumer Behavior
Changes in the components of consumption have been important to
erosion of the sales tax base. A significant reduction in the portion of
consumption devoted to goods and a corresponding increase in the portion
devoted to services has narrowed the base because most services are not
taxed. Table 2 illustrates that consumers spent 47.4% of their income on
services in 1979 and this percentage had grown to 59.1% by 2002.
The extent of the erosion is lessened by the fact that about one-half of this
growth was in medical services, which are taxed to a noticeable extent in only
Hawaii and New Mexico. On the other hand, food is responsible for a nearly
equal share of the decline in goods consumption, and food is also not taxable
in many cases.

74. See The Streamlined Sales Tax ProjectAnswers the Question... Is OrangeJuice a Fruitor
a Beverage?, at http://www.nga.org/nga/salestax/1, I 169,00.html.
75. For example, the Texas legislation did not include destination-based sourcing for the local
sales tax.
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2:

PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES,

1979 AND 200276

1979

2002

(Percent)
100.0
13.4
5.9

(Percent)
100.0
11.9
5.2

Household

5.2

4.4

Other Durables
Nondurable Goods

2.4
39.1

2.4
29.0

Food and Beverage

20.3

14.1

Other Nondurables
Services

18.8
47.4

14.9
59.1

Expenditure
Total
Durable Goods
Autos
Furniture and

The behavioral changes have been fostered in part by new technologies
and new products. Digitization, for example, has allowed the development of
a new set of products that were not envisioned in state tax law and may not be
taxable unless specifically enumerated in state statutes. Internet access in
Tennessee is a good example, where the court denied the state efforts to apply
the tax based on the telecommunications statutes. Also, the digitization
process transforms goods from a tangible to an intangible format that can
make some formerly taxable transactions not taxable. Some of these issues
are being addressed within the streamlined sales tax agreement.
5. Tax Planning
To some extent, businesses are able to plan both their sales and corporate
tax liabilities within the United States. A number of analysts appear to
believe that the extent of tax sheltering has grown dramatically in recent years
and has been an important source of tax base erosion, as was discussed above
for the federal corporate income tax.77
Of course, tax planning is often enabled by some of the factors already
discussed, including federal and state policy, multistate transactions, and
multistate companies, so tax planning is not a completely independent source
of erosion. For example, companies may be able to plan their sales tax
liabilities by creating a separate corporate tax structure for bricks and mortar
76. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts.
77. See Mackie III, supra note 43; DESAI, supra note 46.
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stores and for online sales. Some states, such as Arkansas, have sought to
lessen the opportunity for such tax planning by asserting nexus over online
companies that have the same name and other linkages to the bricks and
mortar stores that have physical presence in the state. 78
Companies have many options for corporate tax planning including the
use of LLCs, Delaware holding companies, exploiting P.L. 86-272, and
others. In some cases the planning has been viewed as abusive, such as when
a number of banks in California formed mutual funds in an effort to escape
corporate income taxation. 79 But, determination of when a shelter is abusive
is very much in the eye of the beholder. Thus, Professor Joel Slemrod has
recently argued that the better term is tax selfishness because of the difficulty
80Sttshvatepea
of distinguishing between avoidance and evasion.
States have attempted a
number of policies to lessen the extent of tax planning, including required
combined reporting, disallowing certain deductions between closely related
companies (such as royalty payments and interest), developing alternative tax
structures (such as a value-added tax), and imposing a minimum tax. Each of
these policy fixes has advantages and disadvantages, but none will eliminate
all forms of tax planning. Indeed, Professor James Hines, Jr. has argued that
attempts by governments to eliminate tax planning may ultimately harm
economic efficiency by inducing business to spend even more on identifying
tax-planning techniques-resources that are ultimately lost to the economy. 8 I
V. CONCLUSION

The extremely weak state revenue picture of the past several years may
bias downwards our perspective on how revenues have performed over the
long-term. Still, the past 15 years' experience suggests that tax revenues,
except for the personal income tax, will grow more slowly than the economy
in the future. Most of the forces causing state tax revenue growth to slow are
outside the states' control, and states will need to be increasingly creative to
maintain their revenues in this evolving environment.
States appear to have four basic options. First, state government tax
revenue as a share of personal income could be allowed to fall, meaning that
at least the own-source-financing part of state government would become
smaller. It is important to remember that state government revenues have
78. The California Franchise Tax Board has ruled that Borders and Borders.con are
sufficiently related that Borders.com has nexus within existing California legislation.
79. See generally LeAnn Luna, Corporate Tax Avoidance: Strategies and Solutions, J.
MULTISTATE TAX'N & INCENTIVES 6 (2004), for a discussion of some of these examples.
80. Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness, NAT'L TAX ASS'N,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 96TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE (forthcoming).
81. See HINES, JR., supra note 44, at 2.
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risen as a share of personal income over the past years, so the decline would
not be relative to the long-term levels of state revenues. The consequences of
lower revenues depend in part on whether state governments respond by
reducing programs such as education and infrastructure (relative to the
economy) or by decreasing programs such as Medicaid, corrections, and
mental health programs.
Second, states could reduce their reliance on sales and corporate income
taxes and increase their reliance on personal income, wage, and property
taxes. The role played by various taxes has been changing over time, as
evidenced by the rapid decline in the importance of selective sales taxes and
the increasing role played by the individual income tax and, until recently, by
the sales tax. 8' The personal income tax will rise as a share of total taxes even
without direct state action because of the higher revenue elasticity. States
may ultimately increase the income tax role more radically through policy
decisions, such as higher rates. But, this would probably mean higher average
rates, not more progressive rates. As described above, states' ability to
impose high rates on upper income individuals and on nonlabor income is
being constrained by many of the same forces that. limit corporate taxation.
Further, states will be increasingly constrained in the level of taxation that
businesses and individuals will accept. Vote-with-your-feet responses to
taxation can be expected to expand as the costs of mobility fall. Thus, states
will be forced to provide high-income people and businesses with services
that they want if higher tax rates are to be imposed. These groups will not be
easily available to subsidize services for others.
Third, states can transfer responsibilities to local governments or reduce
the intergovernmental transfers to local governments. Local governments
then have a similar set of options. One likely outcome is that local
governments will rely more on the property tax, which effectively means that
the property tax will to some extent substitute for state taxes. Options 2 and 3
together point to greater use of income/wage and property taxes and lesser
reliance on other taxes. This is best seen as increased (at least relatively)
taxation of less mobile bases (workers and property) and reduced taxation of
more mobile bases (transactions and business profits).
Fourth, states can seek to fix their traditional taxes, and particularly the
sales and corporate income taxes, to offset the weaknesses arising from the
causes described above. The SSTP, discussions of broadening the sales tax
82. Sales taxes rose as a share of total state taxes from their advent in the early 1930s until
1996. They fell every year from 1996 through 2001 before rising in 2002 and 2003 in response to the
dramatic fall in personal income tax revenues. A combination of more states adopting the tax and
higher tax rates were the primary reasons for the growing role of sales taxes. The tax fell as a share of
revenues when state rate increases became much less frequent.
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base to services, and recent corporate tax legislation in states such as New
Jersey are all examples of attempts to fix the problems. Combined reporting,
entity level taxes on pass-through firms, and minimum taxes are all options
being considered or legislated in some states. Unfortunately, states cannot
fully legislate tax structures that overcome the problems. Federal legislation
that enables (such as with the SSTP) or does not unduly limit states (such as
in the business activity tax arena) is essential and federal policy must not
tightly confine states. Perhaps more importantly, competitive pressures limit
what states can do (or are willing to do) politically (such as adding unitary
reporting and broadening the sales tax base to many services). States are
unlikely to make aggressive forays into areas that are perceived to harm their
economic climate. Further, tax reforms may be unable to deal effectively with
issues relating to many multinational concerns, like services sold over the
Internet from foreign companies and international payments to related
companies.
In the end, most states will muddle through using a combination of these
four options and a few states that are creative, foresightful, and politically
courageous will design tax systems that best take advantage of the evolving
economic and political structure. All else equal, the latter states will be in the
strongest position in terms of stimulating economic development and
generating the revenues necessary to fund essential public services.

